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LAW AVOIDING REALITY:
JOURNEY THROUGH THE VOID TO THE REAL
Richard Briles Moriarty*
Few facets of existence escape the attention of the law. Concerning
itself with everything, how does the law respond to nothing? Con-
fronted with nothingness, particularly in its own midst, the law strives
to corral it within defined boundaries.
That the legal system, society's fastidious rule-maker, endeavors to
control nothingness through categorization is characteristic and aston-
ishing. The DePaul community is invited to look back at the law it-
self, and its pretense of logic and realism, through the literally empty
window created by this endeavor. As inhabitants of the void - view-
ing law as framed by, and exposed through, this window - we may
detect when and how the legal system can co-exist comfortably with
the nebulous concept of reality.
The ultimate message may be clearly stated. The law can persist
through inertia and the enormous power accorded to it by society. To
thrive, and to further social evolution, requires far more. Judges and
lawyers should, in the manner of good scientists, continually question
and test assumptions. Prior decisional law should be respected to the
extent it retains ongoing persuasiveness and relevance. That respect
should never mask mindless repetition as a substitute for current rea-
soning. Most importantly, decisions and actions must be explained
with as much precision, publicly acceptable rationale and humility as
can be mustered.
Judges and lawyers, routinely expecting supervisors in employment
discrimination cases to explain their decisions, view testimony by
those supervisors skeptically, unless supported by articulated persua-
sive rationales. The standards for the law's sentinels should be much
higher.
* The author was Legal Literature Survey Editor in 1973-1974. He created and brought to
fruition the first "Survey of Legal Literature" (23 DEPAUL L. REv. 975-1184 (1974)), which
examined, through extended essays and short reviews, legally-related literature published during
the prior year. Serving mostly in public sector legal positions since graduating, the author is
currently an Assistant Attorney General at the Wisconsin Department of Justice in Madison,
Wisconsin. All views and blunders are solely his own.
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In disputes with teenagers, parents may prevail, without expressing
reasons meaningful to those teenagers, by relying on sheer power.
Like parents who force teenagers to obedience, the law utterly fails
unless it justifies its views with clarity and humility, and conveys an
ongoing readiness to change and adapt. This vital task is often
avoided precisely because it is difficult and exhausting. It is difficult
and exhausting precisely because it is vital.
The chief societal benefit of the recent judicial debacle entitled
Bush v. Gore,' is how well it confirms these points. The majority, sur-
prising seasoned Court observers, unnecessarily drained the Court's
deep reservoir of public respect. That reservoir was carefully filled in
increments, and nurtured over many decades, by prior Courts attend-
ing to what was so glaringly absent in Bush: rationales publicly ac-
cepted as authoritative because they were persuasive rather than
dependent on raw power. The majority's shocking inability, or unwill-
ingness, to articulate publicly acceptable reasons for short-circuiting
established judicial processes, and the democratic processes created
by the Founders, left the country staring into that drained reservoir
and, unexpectedly, a constitutional void.
We will return to Bush v. Gore to consider alternatives readily avail-
able to the majority. For now, we should step through the window in
which the law has framed nothingness and begin our journey. After
stepping through that window, we should stop and sit awhile - not
from exhaustion, but to get our bearings and allow our minds to clear.
Worthwhile journeys only occur after allowing distractions, and prior
concerns, to fall away. They are not marked by distances traveled or
sights recorded. Sitting, and allowing the mental journey to begin by
looking back at the frame of that window, reveals the varying ways
that the law responds when the actions of its own agents should be
deemed void and what that tells us about the law itself.
When legal bodies act without jurisdiction - the lifeblood of legal
existence - those actions must, necessarily, be "void." The law's facil-
ity for alternately applying and avoiding that conclusion, while pre-
tending consistency, might baffle a Houdini. Examining how the law
declares life to exist within some of those empty shells discloses irrec-
oncilable disparities between the solemn mask worn by the law and
the fragile human face beneath that mask.
If a legal body acts without jurisdiction and that absence of power is
transparent in the records of the proceedings in which the action was
attempted, the law says that the action never occurred. The action is
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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not simply branded illegal or unworthy of enforcement. A "void" ac-
tion, and by inference the court or agency itself while engaging in the
action, actually do not exist. They are black holes in the law.
As with black holes in space, little can be learned from scrutinizing
the seeming emptiness of these legal black holes. The human mind
finds direct contemplation of nothingness exceedingly difficult. Far
more fruitful, both for astronomers and lawyers, is to examine the ef-
fects of these perceived non-entities on what surrounds them. Orders
that are "void from entry" usually drag all activities relying on those
orders down into the abyss of nothingness. This delinquent behavior
is strikingly similar to the effect that spacial black holes have on their
neighborhoods.
Not all legal black holes, however, are as they seem. Though logic
requires that all orders entered without jurisdiction must be "void
from entry," many such orders are not favored with this elegant status.
An order is merely "voidable" - not "void" - if the jurisdictional de-
fect is hidden beneath translucent or opaque public records. If evi-
dence must be presented before the defect can be detected, the order
is simply "voidable."
Mere semantics? Not in the law - where words, quite literally, gov-
ern life and death. One might suppose that voidable orders are just
void orders awaiting discovery since, entered without jurisdiction,
they similarly lack the essential ingredient for legal existence. Signifi-
cant difference is declared to obtain, however, between apples with
unblemished skin that are rotten inside, and apples no more corrupted
internally whose skin discloses rot.
Void orders may be challenged at any time, in the same case or any
other case. They have no legal effect - no existence - whether chal-
lenged or not. Voidable orders are deemed valid until evidence shows
that they were entered without jurisdiction, although their hidden ju-
risdictional defects may be more substantial than defects in orders
deemed "void from entry." More startling, voidable orders must be
challenged within the time limits, and in the manner, required to cor-
rect mere judicial mistakes. If not attacked soon enough, or in the
right way, within the same court case, those subject to voidable orders
will find themselves irrevocably and irreparably controlled by those
orders even though - had the same jurisdictional defects appeared on
the face of the proceedings - the orders would be deemed completely
non-existent in perpetuity.
This distinction between void and voidable orders makes no logical
sense. One is as jurisdictionally deficient - as much an empty shell -
as the other. The apple analogy discloses the law's true motivation
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and, more generally, the underlying operating principle for most legal
decisions: the distinction makes superb practical sense. To state that,
regardless of outward appearance, any apple which turns out to be
rotten was always "void" would be extremely destabilizing to society.
No apple could be trusted. Limiting actual voidness to those apples
detectably rotten upon inspection of their outer skins is a workable
compromise for society's governor. Each day, its paper produce may
be delivered with confidence, through thousands of outlets, to markets
across the country.
The problem - the inner rot in legal thought - arises when the law
expounds this distinction, and many other critical distinctions, as if
they were logically sound rather than perfectly reasonable and practi-
cal compromises in which logic is acknowledged and ignored. This
undercuts the primary goal of the law: to create and maintain rules
that will, hopefully, govern society and the interaction of its members
in ways that sustain societal stability and development. Citizens can
only be expected to accept legal pronouncements if they perceive at
least surface validity in whatever reasoning the law uses to justify its
rules.
A considerable amount of contradiction and illogic necessarily per-
vades the law. Practical compromises and, more deeply, the true na-
ture of reality as we are coming to understand it, make this inevitable.
Properly articulated and explained, societal members would accept ra-
tionales that openly recognize these limitations. To the extent that the
law instead contends that logic and consistency underlies its rules
when they do not, it invites skepticism about the legitimacy of the
rules and of the law itself. The pretense that judges dip into pools of
universal truth behind their benches - rather than expound rationales
that should humbly commence with acknowledgments of how little we
actually know - is contrary to reality and to the law's viability as a
positive social tool.
Looking back at Bush v. Gore, for example, we can easily construct
alternative decisions that would have merited public acceptance while
placing the controversy in proper constitutional context. Ironically,
under those alternative dispositions, Governor Bush would still have
prevailed, through the structures contemplated by the Founders, the
Electoral College or Congress, rather than having his Presidency tar-
nished with the charge of having been selected by a conservative ma-
jority of the Court for ideological reasons.
Start with an opinion attributed to its author and drafted to achieve
public acceptance rather than end results. (As Linda Greenhouse co-
gently characterized the majority view, it was a "conclusion in search
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of a rationale."'2) Had the opinion concluded that Florida's recount
procedures fell far short of the Court's newly articulated stiff Equal
Protection standards and that those standards were mandated for this
and future similarly situated elections, it would have resonated well
with the public. With its long-term positive implications for the very
people disenfranchised in Florida, such conclusions would have had
healing, rather than disruptive, effects on the country.
What was indefensible and unexplainable - or at least unexplained
in acceptable terms - was the majority's refusal to trust the State court
to play out the last, and virtually inevitable, act in the play. The proof
is in the pudding. The State court, on remand from the high court's
unseemly and anonymous imposition, in the dead of night, of a dead-
line for democracy two hours from its issuance, was entitled to simply
noted that remand was meaningless and dismiss on that basis. If cor-
rectly cast as incorrigible partisans, as the majority apparently as-
sumed, the State court would undoubtedly have transformed its
opportunity to have the last word to partisan advantage. In that
event, the constitutional structures, driven by the factions fully recog-
nized by the Founders, would have been called on to expend political
capital to put Governor Bush in the White House, all part of the con-
stitutional plan.
Instead, the State court took care to articulate a more compelling
rationale for dismissal. It declared that only deliberative legislative
action could develop standards that would pass Equal Protection mus-
ter, that the broken eggs of this election simply could not be reassem-
bled and that, as a result, no meaningful recount process was feasible.3
The State court, down to a bare majority favoring the Gore campaign
before being reversed by the high court, would undoubtedly have
reached that same conclusion on a true remand. The judicial conclu-
sion that human frailties and constitutional realities required a prema-
ture end to counting the ballots (some for the first time) was
inevitable. It would have been better accepted from the State court
that had ruled twice for the Gore campaign rather than the federal
high court that, inexplicably, stayed the relatively orderly counting
process directed by Judge Lewis. Unlike what actually occurred, this
alternative coda would have garnered grudging understanding from
most Gore supporters, particularly if accompanied by the marvelous
judicial acknowledgment of human frailty noted earlier by Justice
Harding: "The circumstances of this election call to mind a quote from
2. Linda Greenhouse, A Special Report: Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
3. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
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football coaching legend Vince Lombardi: 'We didn't lose the game,
we just ran out of time.'"4
Remarkably, apologists for the Bush v. Gore majority eschew any
ideological or political motivation by proposing that the majority in-
stead believed the State court had to be brought to heel and could not
be trusted. When a parent grounds a teenager without either explain-
ing why or exploring less domineering alternatives, the relationship
between the parent and teenager suffers. The majority needlessly
punished the State court by grounding the entire country.
Had the Bush v. Gore majority trusted to the processes by which we
are governed, articulated persuasive rationales for the decisions it
made and, most importantly, refrained from imperious declarations
such as Justice Scalia remarking that the recounts were stopped simply
because five Justices thought they should be, the country might now
be recovering, rather than reeling, from the election. The Bush major-
ity derailed this national drama, which was proceeding according to
the Constitutional plan, from ending in ways that comported with that
plan. No political spin can hide the festering wound that the Court
could easily have healed. With the "irreparable harm" inflicted by the
majority, the nation must endure, half-seething and half-afraid.
Many debilitating impacts result from judges pretending that practi-
cal solutions, deriving from individual circumstances arising from his-
torical frameworks, remain permanently grounded in timeless
rationality. When false images cloak practical compromises that the
law refrains from acknowledging, not only is public acceptance of the
law's legitimacy sapped, but alteration or abandonment of those com-
promises, if later exposed as unreasonable or inhumane, is made dra-
matically more wrenching and arduous.
Any thought system, for example, which declares black and female
human beings to be objects owned by others, declares lifeless corpo-
rate entities to be persons and declares contracts designed to oppress
workers to be sacred, as the law has done, should find the mantle of
consistency and rationality an ill-fitting garment. Immense struggles
have been, and continue to be, waged over these issues largely be-
cause the law, in the past, convinced large sections of society that its
pronouncements were expressions of discovered truth and wisdom.
Slavery would still have been visited on this country had the law not
imbued it with sanctity. The blame for corrupting this continent with
four centuries of slavery and its devastating aftermath is hardly re-
served to the legal profession. Nonetheless, its abolition would have
4. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1273 (Fla. 2000) (Harding and Shaw, JJ., dissenting).
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been far less ruinous if the economic and social motivations for slav-
ery were left to stand on their own - subject to unfettered reassess-
ments as society changed - without the law's false shields of truth and
rationality.
Similarly, the paradigms of male dominance that strangled social
evolution over the past several centuries would have largely prevailed
even if the law had not rendered its imprimatur. Without the law's
pretense that eternal verity underlay male dominance (enlisting relig-
ious support from biblical passages authored by patriarchal thinkers),
this incredibly debilitating paradigm might have been more effectively
challenged and discarded long ago. Instead, the concept of women as
sub-humans was woven deeply into the law's internal structures. As a
result, even lawyers of both genders who consciously and strenuously
work towards equal treatment of women unknowingly perpetuate this
nefarious myth through seemingly innocuous legal principles, tools
and language. A minor example of the dangerously insidious effects
of the law's past support of slavery, patriarchy and other social hierar-
chies is cogently summed up in a topic found in every West Digest -
"Master and Servant" - to encompass decisions that could be more
neutrally categorized as "Employment" or "Labor and Employment."
Less charged examples of the dangers of rationalizing the law's soci-
etal choices as if they were discovered rather than chosen are plenti-
ful. Requiring medical doctors to testify to a "reasonable degree of
medical certainty" and divorcing spouses to assert under oath that
they were subjected to cruelty without "any cause or provocation" at-
tributable to the testifying spouse - when lawyers, judges and the af-
fected members of the public know that neither can truthfully say any
such thing - is sanctioned perjury that breeds contempt for the law.
That both requirements are now more relaxed only underscores why
they should never have been imposed in the first place.
Throughout history, some of the law's goals were achievable
through focused holdings publicly acknowledged as practical com-
promises appropriate, at that time, for the limited purposes involved.
Other goals sanctified by the law were never justifiable and should
never have been adopted. Indeed, the legal practice of disseminating
sanctifying rationales, rather than genuine ones, may well have devel-
oped precisely to disguise actions that were nothing more than raw
power grabs.
If so, our modern democratic republic should not be trapped by rea-
soning systems that supported those raw power grabs in earlier times.
If legal declarations are publicly understood to represent practical
compromises appropriate to the circumstances, that facilitates respect
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for those declarations. Such understandings would also facilitate ad-
hering to those declared principles only so long as they are rationally
justified while inviting adjustments or abandonment, without unneces-
sarily wrenching consequences, when circumstances change. Some, in
society, will always see legal rationalizations as nothing other than
covers for raw power grabs. That cynical attitude can best be coun-
tered, or marginalized, by articulating the often practical reasons for
legal action, and their potentially limited application, without any pre-
tense of greater wisdom. This does not mean, as in Bush v. Gore,
declaring a broad constitutional principle and then, seemingly fearful
of that principle, arbitrarily rendering it toothless even in the case on
review. It means both engaging in a genuine, intelligent dialogue with
the public and appearing to do so. Judges, as public servants, should
speak to, and never down to, the public.
Judicial facades of timeless logic and consistancy can ring harshly in
the everyday world. It may appear logical, in the rarified air within
judicial chambers, to apply the same standards to attacks on affirma-
tive action plans as are applied to discrimination claims made by
blacks, women, and other historical outsiders. The mathematical pre-
cision with which this equation can be expressed presents a symmetry
that is almost irresistibly compelling to judges who delude themselves
into thinking like mathematicians.
Were we mere digits in a world governed by mathematics, the anal-
ysis might have surface validity. Even then, it would be appropriate to
recognize the failure to include important factors in the "equation."
Centuries of racial suppression, millennia of ingrained biases against
women, ongoing networks of support for dominant cultures which ac-
tively and subtly exclude others (and provide unlabeled "affirmative
action" to dominant group members), and many other factors would
lengthen and complicate the equation.
The real error, however, is in thinking mathematically at all. Judges
imbued with the arrogance of certainty can declare this symmetry to
exist. Wiser judges recognize that we have only a tenuous grasp on
reality and must construct our values from the dynamic interaction of
relativity, relationality, uncertainty, impermanence and uniqueness.
Those hallmarks of reality that we have, in the past, teased out of
the darkness mirror the actual driving forces of the law. Despite the
veneer of majesty, eternal verities and sanctity, the law functions most
effectively when abiding by the principles of relativity (all things are
relative to one another), relationality (all things are related to one
another), uncertainty (all things are, at some level, incapable of being
definitively predicted or categorized), impermanence (all things
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change) and uniqueness (all things are different from one another)
within a universe in which the totality of existence is a mere shadow in
the wind.
Comprehending each of these forces and how they interact in the
midst of nothingness could produce a mental map by which we under-
stand where we are and prepare ourselves for where we may be going.
Graduates of DePaul, like the law's other practitioners, work with and
use these forces, perhaps unconsciously, on a daily basis. Recogniz-
ing, and openly acknowledging, this fact may allow the legal profes-
sion to wean itself of its dependence on any pretense to timeless truth
and rationality and to operate with the flexibility and honesty that can
genuinely serve society well.
A century ago, the human mind was unlocked by a functionary in
the Swiss legal system, a patent clerk, and, to put it simplistically, by
one word. Once the implications were acknowledged, that one word,
"relativity," transformed our perceptions of the universe, ourselves
and everything on which we can contemplate. No area of human
thought is immune from the highly contagious virus of relativity un-
leashed by Einstein. The virus was so pervasive, disruptive and per-
manent that Einstein himself refused to fully accept the consequences,
leaving his followers to prove that his hesitation was unwarranted.
Philosophies which, before Einstein, centered exclusively and un-
equivocally on a particular certainty may still do so. They must, how-
ever, now maintain constant vigilance against reality through a
persistent, and often militant, focus on that centering process to the
exclusion of contrary evidence.
The concept of relativity, while transforming, is ultimately debilitat-
ing and destructive of motivations to be value-oriented (a central fail-
ing of certain forms of situation ethics) unless meshed with another
crucial concept, relationality. Not only are all things relative to one
another, they are related to one another. The interplay between rela-
tivity and relationality is what gives meaning and direction to our lives
and existence. Regardless of whether our names and deeds last much
beyond our individual lifetimes, or whether, after death, we disperse
without trace into particles, we would each still, due to the interaction
between relativity and relationality, have been of great consequence
to the universe.
This is not narrow homocentrism. It is equally true that each
lifeform and expression of matter, due to the interaction between rela-
tivity and relationality, is of great consequence to the universe. In
2001] till
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Fritjof Capra's fine phrasing, we are more than cousins to all life. 5 We
have a relation to each lifeform that is dependent on the relative posi-
tions of that lifeform and ourselves at any given time - and we each
have many varied positions, and many given times, during our
lifetimes.
Mundane examples of the interaction between relativity and rela-
tionality arise from noting the interplay between differing tires and
surfaces. Wide balloon tires may skid uselessly on ice but glide effort-
lessly through sand. High bicycle tires on a Model T may cut through
deep snow - while lower vehicles with larger tires would flounder -
but would be unsteady support for a Chevy on dry pavement.
A magnificent expression of the interaction between relativity and
relationality was rendered by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.,
in his Letter from Birmingham Jail: "We are caught in an inescapable
network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever
affects one directly affects all indirectly."' 6 Becoming imbued with this
principle could adequately govern one's life.
Constitutional and legal practitioners may be easily led astray if, in
their efforts to justify legal structures, they appreciate relativity, and
even the importance of valuing the negative, without recognizing our
relatedness:
The necessary consequence of taking the sense of the community by
the concurrent majority is ... to give each interest or portion of the
community a negative on the others. It is this mutual negative
among its various conflicting interests which invests each with the
power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each
where they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship.
Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effective resis-
tance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the
others; and without this there can be no constitution. It is this nega-
tive power-the power of preventing or arresting the action of the
government, be it called by what term it may, veto, interposition,
nullification, check, or balance of power-which in fact forms the
constitution. They are all but different names for the negative
power. In all its forms, and under all its names, it results from the
concurrent majority. Without this there can be no negative, and
without a negative, no constitution. The assertion is true in refer-
ence to all constitutional governments, be their form what they may.
It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and
the positive which makes the government. The one is the power of
5. See generally FRITJOF CAPRA, UNCOMMON WISDOM: CONVERSATIONS WITH REMARKABLE
PEOPLE 71-89 (1988).
6. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS
AND SIECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 85 (James M. Washington ed., 1992).
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acting, and the other the power of preventing or arresting action.
The two, combined, makes constitutional governments. 7
The mind which expressed these critical principles, ironically, failed to
detect the sty in the eye of the human in whom that mind resided.
John C. Calhoun instead enlisted those mental energies in the service
of perpetuating slavery as if it were an institution sanctioned by the
heavens. His clear vision of the complexities of relativity, unmoored
from relatedness, led to tragedy.
Spiraling closer to understanding reality requires an expansion be-
yond the interplay between relativity and relationality to encompass
dynamic interplays with three other factors - uncertainty, imperma-
nence and uniqueness - in a universe in which matter hardly seems to
matter at all. Returning again to voidness as it actually is, rather than
as, rather laughably, it is confined by the law, allows us to draw these
three factors into the mix.
Contemplating voidness in a practical way does not require modern
scientific equipment. Unquestionably, philosophical tomes present
the subject in forbidding modes. Swimming in oceans of unnecessarily
complicated analyses of nothingness by Sartre, Hegel and Aristotle,
one can stumble upon insights of intense clarity. Mostly, their analy-
ses obscure rather than enlighten - as even Sartre's inaccessible title,
Being and Nothingness: A Phenomological Essay on Ontology,8
confirms.
Not all philosophers, fortunately, weave such tangled webs. Lucre-
tius, in his wonderfully titled On the Nature of Things,9 concluded
2,000 years ago that there had to be voidness because otherwise things
would have no room to move about.'0 That wizard of uncommon
sense also declared, contrary to mere sensory evidence, that "however
solid objects seem, they yet are formed of matter mixed with void."''
Before biologists and physicists informed us of the vast empty spaces,
cellular and galactic, which render insignificant the miniscule amount
of matter in the universe, intuition insisted that our bodies are solid.
It seems idiotic to look at one's hand, touch it, strike it against a seem-
ingly solid surface and acknowledge and accept - instead of just say -
that the hand and surface are barely there. Lucretius perceived that
truth without a magnifying lens larger than his own mind.
7. John C. Calhoun, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 28 (1953).
8. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NORTHINGNESS: A PHENOMOLOGICAL ESSAY ON ONTOL-
OGY (Hazel E. Barnes, trans., 1956).
9. Tirus LUCREIUS CARUS, ON THE NATURE OF THINGS (Anthony M. Escolen trans., 1995).
10. Id. at Book I, lines 332-340.
11. Id. at Book I, lines 334-350.
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We lesser mortals find it difficult to understand the status of solidity
in a sea of nothingness although it now seems indisputable that "[a]
single grain of sand in the center of Albert Hall would be less lonely
than an atom in your desk separated from its neighbors."' 2 A more
impressionistic, though unintended, expression of this aspect of reality
was conveyed by the Beatles: "Now I know how many holes it takes to
fill the Albert Hall."' 3
Well, we may say, this has been an interesting walk down the beach
so far, but it will have all the relevance of a sandcastle at high tide
after we return to our offices and courtrooms. A tenuous connection
with existence would hardly suffice as a foundation for a legal struc-
ture. The law assumes solidity and stability, while compartmentalizing
nothingness within a few relatively harmless boxes, for good practical
reasons. It is not just lack of solidity that threatens the legal mind.
More unsettling, the law, to accept reality, would have to surrender
certainty.
Before returning to the practicalities of our worklifes, walk a bit
further down the beach and realize that, at the subatomic level, parti-
cles are disturbingly unpredictable - to the point that physicists are
convinced that unpredictability is the one thing that is dependable.
Reality, if examined closely enough, is frighteningly nebulous. The
little matter that does exist is unreliable. The universe itself, some
speculate, may have originated from a "vacuum fluctuation" - a blip
out of nothingness.
The legal system, fearing uncertainty, may champion and shield the
deepest concerns of paranoid humankind. The characteristic that dis-
tinguishes humans from other lifeforms may not, ultimately, be
speech, thought, memory, toolmaking or any other positive feature
that humans are arrogant enough to wrongly deny to other lifeforms.
It is, more likely, humans' insatiable urge to control and contain the
unknown - primarily by negating, rendering meaningless or objecti-
fying the "other." Only by eliminating all but what humans can assure
to be within their grasp, the prevailing paradigm insists, can internal
satisfaction ever be achieved.
In actuality, the perceived threats presented by women to men, by
blacks to whites, by natural to human-crafted environments, are not
nearly as dangerous as those posed by unsatisfied dominant humans
who fear the unknown. One alternative - perhaps the ultimate practi-
12. J. GRIIBEN, IN SEARCH OF THE BiG BANG: QUANTUM PHYSICS AN!) COSMOL OGY Xvi
(1986).
13. THE BEATLES, A Day in the Life, on SG. PEPPER'S LONELY HEART'S CLUB BAND (1967).
1114 [Vol. 50:1.103
LAW AVOIDING REALITY
cal choice - could be to embrace the unknown and, by embracing it, to
occasionally make it part of our known world.
This touches on a third startling discovery that, physicists believe,
discloses the real world. At the subatomic level, particles appear to
make choices, and to come into observable existence, based on
whether they are observed or not. If true, nothing sometimes be-
comes something because it is being observed. Falling trees may shat-
ter the silence of a forest devoid of humanity but a particle detectable
only with the most sophisticated equipment may choose to remain in
the void if humans are not watching. Was it waiting for us all these
eons? Or just for a nanosecond? Are we arrogantly assuming, again,
that existence awaits our attention? Or are we opening our minds to
the interrelationships between lifeforms that literally rely on one an-
other for existence?
With the visionary intuition of a poet, Rilke's ode to the mental
creation of a unicorn is a moving and breathtaking expression of this
potential phenomenon:
This is the creature there never has been.
They never knew it, and yet, none the less,
they loved the way it moved, its suppleness,
its neck, its very gaze, mild and serene.
Not there, because they loved it, it behaved
as though it were. They always left some space.
And in that clear unpeopled space they saved
it lightly reared its head, with scarce a trace
of not being there. They fed it, not with corn,
but only with the possibility of being.
And that was able to confer
such strength, its brow put forth a horn. One horn.
Whitely it stole up to a maid,-to be
within the silver mirror and in her.' 4
Admittedly, the law cannot reside on such quicksand surrounded by
nothingness. Societal rules need, at some level, to be grounded on
sufficient certainty and substance, even if make-believe, to command
compliance. After all, the willingness to comply with legal strictures
probably derives from the same part of the human brain which insists
that hands, and surfaces struck by hands, are both solid. That ground-
ing principle is wholly practical. If adopted, it is critical that legal
14. RAINER MARIA RILKE, SONNETS -1-0 ORPHEUS 95 (J. Leishman trans. 1949), quoted in
LIAM HUDSON, THE CUUr OF THE FACT: A PSYCHOLOGIST'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CRrrIZUE OF
His DISCIPLINE 19 (1972).
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practitioners neither forget that it is contrary to reality nor act
otherwise.
Reality as generally accepted in society may, as Jane Wagner suc-
cinctly suggested, either be a "collective hunch" or "an ancient form
of crowd control that got out of hand." 15 For perspective, and a sorely
needed touch of humility, we should remind ourselves from time to
time that the primeval Sanskrit word "Dharma" means both "the law"
and "the all-encompassing void."16
What can members of the DePaul community bring back from our
journey? What can seashells, rocks or photographs contribute to our
worklifes as reminders of the insights gained on "vacations" - i.e., al-
lowing our minds to vacate? Well, we can realize how close we al-
ready are, in our everyday work activities, to applying the interactive
principles of relativity, relationality, uncertainty, impermanence and
uniqueness. Each day, judges look out at advocates and litigants
drawing differing aspects of life, with all of its messiness, uncertainties
and vagaries, into timeslots allocated on their dockets. The underly-
ing life experiences of the litigants are, necessarily, jammed into de-
fined legal categories and summarized into familiar terminology to
assure the judges' attention and obtain practical resolutions.
Wise judges, and advocates, recognize the myths that allow this
structure to continue functioning. Judges, advocates and litigants,
each playing roles relative to, and related to, one another during those
timeslots, should approach their respective tasks by recognizing that
the law, like all human-created institutions, can only try to tease out
the best practical solutions to the individualized problems presented.
Acknowledging that we are all groping in the darkness, we must care-
fully use the few tools that allow us to find our way. If we mistake
those tools for shining beacons that flood, and fill, the void, we will
not likely notice the distinct possibility of a precipice under our next
footfall. If we tread forward with a humble appreciation that we are
constantly exploring new territory, while calling on the imperfect
knowledge we have gained from the past, we will find our way and
actually enjoy the journey.
15. JANE WAGNER, THE SEARCH FOR INTFLIGENT LIFE IN THE UNIVERSE 18, (1986).
16. Robert Aitken, The Body of the Buddha, PARABOLA, Vol. X, No. 3, Aug. 1985, at 26.
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